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 2 
Abstract –  1 
Objectives: In many countries increasing use is being made of Dental Care Professionals 2 
(DCPs) to provide aspects of clinical activity previously undertaken by dentists. This study 3 
evaluates the differences in practice efficiency associated with the utilisation of DCPs in the 4 
provision of General Dental Services in the National Health Service (NHS) in England. 5 
 6 
Methods: 121 NHS practices completed a questionnaire and shared practice information held 7 
at the NHS Business Services Authority. Practice efficiency was estimated using Data 8 
Envelopment Analysis with the robustness of the findings checked using Stochastic Frontier 9 
Model estimation. 10 
 11 
Results: Dental practices operated at an estimated mean level of technical efficiency of 64%. 12 
Variations among practices in the use of DCPs were not associated with variations in practice 13 
efficiency after controlling for other staffing levels, patient population characteristics and 14 
practice variables.  15 
 16 
Conclusions: The current NHS dental contract limits the potential for efficiency 17 
improvements by setting annual practice activity targets that produce little incentive for role-18 
substitution. While DCPs may by practising efficiently this is not reflected in practice level 19 
efficiency, possibly because of dentists using the time released for other non NHS activity. 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 3 
INTRODUCTION  1 
 2 
Maximising health gain from available resources is an ethical imperative for health service 3 
managers internationally1. The United Kingdom (UK) Independent Review of National 4 
Health Service (NHS) dentistry in 2009 concluded that there was an overwhelming need to 5 
make best use of the whole dental workforce2. Across England, approximately 55% of 6 
patients who attend for a regular dental check-up do not require any treatment3. This costs the 7 
NHS over £1 Billion per annum and represents about a quarter of the total annual NHS 8 
expenditure on dental care3. In contrast, half of the population does not attend a dentist on a 9 
regular basis and this group tends to be from the most disadvantaged communities and 10 
experience the majority of oral disease4. As a result, patients with the least need are being 11 
seen by the most expensive resource, the General Dental Practitioner (GDP), whilst patients 12 
with high levels of need appear to have problems accessing NHS dental services5. 13 
 14 
In the UK NHS, there are two categories of GDP: Principals and Associates. Principals own 15 
the dental practice and are responsible for paying estate, staff and consumable costs 16 
associated with the delivery of services under their NHS dental contract. Since 2006, 17 
Principals in England and Wales have been paid according to "Units of Dental Activity" 18 
(UDAs) - a measure of the amount of dental activity provided in a course of treatment. 19 
Courses are allocated into one of three treatment bands. Recall appointments (“check-ups”) 20 
attract one UDA, treatment that involves fillings, root fillings or extractions earn the GDP 21 
three UDAs while laboratory work (e.g., dentures or crowns) generates 12 UDAs. The 22 
amount of UDAs an NHS dental practice may claim in a year is specified in the Annual 23 
Contract Value (ACV), which is set by the local NHS Area Team in England, in discussion 24 
with individual dental practices. Practice Principals contract directly with NHS 25 
commissioners in the NHS Area Team. In contrast, Associates sub-contract with a Practice 26 
Principal, are self-employed, and rent premises, facilities and support staff time from the 27 
practice. Principals and Associates in England and Wales do not receive additional 28 
remuneration for any NHS care delivered over 102% of their respective ACVs and are 29 
penalized through a pro-rata claw-back of remuneration if activity falls below 96% of their 30 
ACV. As such, NHS dental practices in England are “output-constrained” in the number of 31 
UDAs they are contracted to deliver in a given year.  32 
 4 
 1 
Dental Care Professionals (DCPs) are non-dentist members of dental teams. They include 2 
Dental Nurses, Dental Hygienists, Dental Hygiene-Therapists and Dental Therapists. Based 3 
on each profession’s scope of practice, some DCPs perform a supplementary role (e.g. Dental 4 
Nurses) whilst others can perform tasks otherwise undertaken by the GDP, known as role 5 
substitution (e.g. Dental Hygienists, Dental Hygiene-Therapists and Dental Therapists)6. The 6 
rest of this paper refers to DCPs as those dental team members performing activities that 7 
otherwise would be performed by a dentist and hence represent role substitution in NHS 8 
dental practice. Role substitution has the potential to enable Principals to replace higher paid 9 
dentist time with lower paid DCP time in some aspects of NHS service delivery, potentially 10 
reducing the costs of providing the contracted level of activity (ACV)7 and releasing dentist 11 
time for more advanced treatments.  12 
 13 
Role substitution could increase or decrease practice efficiency according to how the dental 14 
practice uses the dentist’s time released. Studies of role substitution in medicine found that 15 
efficiency was improved only when (a) physician time was released from the tasks delegated 16 
to nurses (i.e. nurse time replaces rather than supplements physician time) and (b) released 17 
physician time is used for tasks which only physicians can perform8. In NHS dentistry, the 18 
limited evidence on the economic consequences of role-substitution2,9,10,11 suggests that it has 19 
the potential to reduce labour costs. In other countries, role substitution in dentistry has been 20 
found to increase efficiency and effectiveness in service provision12, with the potential to 21 
release resources and increase the capacity to care13,14,15. 22 
 23 
This study aimed to examine whether practice-level efficiency is associated with the 24 
presence, level and nature of role substitution within NHS dental practices in England. In 25 
particular, we considered the prevalence and nature of DCP use among practices, the relative 26 
contribution of DCPs to service delivery and whether use of DCPs is associated with service 27 
mixes in which prevention is emphasized. The analysis aims to address the following 28 
research questions: (1) Are NHS dental practices that employ DCPs more efficient than 29 
practices that do not employ DCPs; and (2) Among NHS practices that employ DCPs; (a) Is 30 
the level of efficiency associated with the level of DCP use; (b) Is the level of efficiency 31 
 5 
associated with the proportion of clinical time provided by DCPs; (c) Is the proportion of 1 
claims for routine services associated with the level of DCP use? 2 
 3 
METHODS 4 
 5 
All NHS dental practices in the Greater Manchester (n=477), North-East England (n=143) 6 
and South Yorkshire (n=201) regions of England were invited to participate in the study. 7 
These three regions were chosen for their similarity to the England average in NHS earnings 8 
per dentist16, the prevalence of dental caries17 and the national average number of UDAs and 9 
courses of treatment per NHS dentist (Appendix, Table A1). 10 
 11 
Practices within these regions were excluded from the study if the practice was a single 12 
dental chair surgery, a member of a dental corporate body (a listed company providing dental 13 
care from multiple sites) or provided NHS care for children only. This is because role 14 
substitution is unlikely in single-surgery dental practices, whilst practices belonging to 15 
corporate bodies operate under a different incentive structure from most NHS dental 16 
practices. NHS practices with children-only contracts do not offer the full range of clinical 17 
tasks that can be provided by DCPs and hence present more restricted opportunities for role-18 
substitution.   19 
 20 
The number of practices that were contacted and either declined before eligibility could be 21 
assessed or were not eligible was 448 (55% of NHS practices in the regions). Of the eligible 22 
practices, 121 (27%) agreed to participate.  23 
 24 
Each participating practice was asked to complete a short questionnaire about the type and 25 
quantity of resources used in delivering NHS dental care. The domains used in the 26 
questionnaire were based on a review of the existing literature on dental care production and 27 
discussions with NHS dentists from the Greater Manchester Local Professional Network. The 28 
 6 
key resources were the number of NHS hours worked by the different types of staff in the 1 
dental team and the number of dental chairs available for patient treatment. 2 
 3 
Each practice principal was asked to provide consent for the research team to link the 4 
information in the questionnaire to data held at the NHS Business Services Authority (BSA) 5 
on the NHS services delivered by the practice. Data were provided for the fiscal year ending 6 
March 31st 2014. All orthodontic activity was excluded because orthodontic treatment is 7 
remunerated separately and not part of the UDA target18. Table 1 presents information on 8 
data sources and the designation of variables as an input into the production of dental 9 
healthcare or an output (dental healthcare delivered). In the Appendix, Table A2 presents the 10 
practice characteristics measures, and Table A3 presents the patient population and service 11 
mix measures. 12 
 13 
The input data from the questionnaire were used to estimate a production frontier for each 14 
measure of dental healthcare output (Table 1). The estimated production frontier indicates the 15 
estimated maximum output an NHS dental practice is able to produce, given the levels and 16 
mix of resources used. It is through a comparison with the production frontier that the level of 17 
efficiency of an individual practice is inferred. Efficiency scores were estimated using Data 18 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a common approach employed in studies evaluating efficiency 19 
in the healthcare sector1. Further details of the DEA estimation method are found in the online 20 
appendix. 21 
 22 
In addition to the DEA estimates, an alternative approach to efficiency estimation was used to 23 
see whether the findings were sensitive to the method used. Stochastic Frontier Models 24 
(SFMs) decompose efficiency scores to reflect a combination of relative efficiency, 25 
measurement error in the dependent variable and statistical noise19. If the DEA and SFM 26 
approaches yield a large difference in the rank ordering of the efficiency score estimates, this 27 
indicates that one or both of model designs should be reconsidered.  A description of the 28 
SFM’s functional form, distribution function of inefficiency scores, method of estimation and 29 
model fitness is found in the online Appendix. 30 
 7 
 1 
After the first stage estimation of calculating efficiency scores by practice using DEA, 2 
multivariate regression methods were used to explore the relationship of practice efficiency 3 
scores to practice-level factors. If we choose the dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 to represent the 4 
efficiency score of practice i, the second stage model can be written as,  5 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖          i=1,2,…,N  6 
where 𝜀𝜀 is unobserved random error and X is a set of practice characteristics that includes a 7 
measure of the extent of use of mid-level providers at a practice. Details of the methods used 8 
to ensure a feasible and consistent inference in this ‘second stage analysis’ are outlined in the 9 
online Appendix. 10 
  11 
The annual number of UDAs is the measure of healthcare output for calculating the 12 
efficiency scores used in the second-stage analysis. This is a more sensitive measure of the 13 
quantity and value (from a provider perspective) of healthcare delivered than the number of 14 
treatment plans delivered or patients seen. The extent of role substitution in NHS dental 15 
practices was measured in terms of whether a practice employed DCPs to provide care for 16 
NHS patients; the number of sessions devoted to NHS patients by DCPs in a typical week 17 
and the number DCP sessions devoted to NHS patients expressed as a proportion of the 18 
number of dentist sessions devoted to NHS patients. The practice characteristics that served 19 
as control variables in the model were the number of sessions per week worked by practice 20 
dentists on NHS patients, the number of support staff sessions per week (managerial and 21 
administration staff), the number of dentist chairs in each practice, the number of adult (non-22 
elderly) patients (ages 18-59) as a percentage of all patients served, and the percentage of all 23 
patients that are exempt from NHS payment charges (i.e. expectant or nursing mothers, or 24 
those in receipt of Income Support, Job Seekers Allowance, Working Family Tax Credits, or 25 
holding certificates for full or partial help with healthcare costs).  26 
 27 
RESULTS 28 
Completed practice questionnaires were received from 121 practices (27%). Table 2 29 
compares the sample of 121 practices to the entire population of dental practices with NHS 30 
 8 
contracts in England to examine the generalisability of the study sample. Compared to all 1 
NHS practices in England the sample practices had higher annual outputs of UDAs (15,444 2 
and 10,494 respectively, p<0.01), higher annual mean number of patients seen (5,597 and 3 
3,670, p<0.01) and more treatment plans provided per year (7,286 and 4,701, p<0.01). 4 
Despite this difference in scale, the distribution of claims across dental bands of activity and 5 
the percentage of UDAs claimed from treating patients exempt from NHS charges were not 6 
statically different between the sample practices and all NHS practices in England. However, 7 
the mean percentage of treatment activity for adult patients was greater in the sample 8 
practices (74%) than in England (65%). 9 
 10 
The distribution of practice efficiency for the outcome measures (UDAs, numbers of 11 
treatment plans and patients seen) is reported in Table 3. NHS dental practices in England 12 
were operating at an estimated mean level of efficiency of 64%.  13 
 14 
Using a SFM model to estimate efficiency (Table A4 in the Appendix) resulted in 15 
significantly lower mean practice efficiency scores than those estimated using DEA. This was 16 
expected, some measurement errors/statistical noise is excluded from SFM estimates of 17 
efficiency scores. The Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient between SFM and DEA 18 
efficiency scores was 0.72, indicating efficiency rankings of practices were similar under the 19 
alternative approaches. This finding suggests that, if measurement error is present in the DEA 20 
efficiency scores, it is small, a finding which validates DEA as an appropriate choice of 21 
frontier estimation in this research setting.  22 
 23 
Are NHS dental practices that employ DCPs significantly more technically efficient than 24 
practices that do not employ DCPs? 25 
 26 
The association between efficiency scores and the use of DCPs in a practice is presented in 27 
Model 1 in Table 4. Practices that use DCPs to serve NHS patients were found to have (on 28 
average) lower efficiency than practices with no DCPs, after controlling for other practice 29 
and patient characteristics. The mean efficiency difference was 14% (p<0.001). This finding 30 
 9 
was robust to the use of different output measures in the production function (treatment plans 1 
and patients seen), where the efficiency difference remained large (11%) and statistically 2 
significant.  3 
 4 
Is the level of technical efficiency significantly associated with the level of DCP use among 5 
NHS dental practices that employ DCPs? 6 
 7 
Among practices employing DCPs, no association was observed between efficiency scores 8 
and level of role substitution (number of DCP weekly sessions worked with NHS patients) 9 
after controlling for patient and practice characteristics (Model 2 in Table 4). This finding 10 
was robust to the use of treatment plans and patients seen as output measures.  In both 11 
Models 1 and 2, the number of administration support staff sessions was associated with 12 
lower efficiency, although the size of this association was small (0.5% and 4.2% lower 13 
efficiency respectively). 14 
 15 
Is the level of efficiency significantly associated with the proportion of clinical time provided 16 
by DCPs among those NHS dental practices that employ DCPs? 17 
 18 
No association was observed between practice efficiency and the time provided by DCPs as a 19 
proportion of dentist time for any of the output measures (Model 3 in Table 4). In other 20 
words, no evidence was found that role substitution (DCPs contributing a higher proportion 21 
of total provider time in a practice) contributes to practice efficiency. 22 
 23 
Is the proportion of claims for routine services significantly associated with the level of DCP 24 
use among NHS dental practices that employ DCPs? 25 
 26 
In terms of the service mix of practices, the number of DCP sessions per se did not explain 27 
differences between practices in service mix (proportion out of all treatments delivered that 28 
 10 
are NHS payment Band 1, Band 2 and Band 3) after controlling for staffing levels, patient 1 
population and practice environment variables. However, when expressed as a proportion of 2 
dentist time, DCP time was shown to be associated with variations in the proportion of 3 
practice output made up by preventive care. A 1% higher input in DCP weekly sessions 4 
relative to dentist weekly sessions was associated with a 3.6% percentage higher proportion 5 
of the service mix made up of preventive treatments. Hence, role substitution does appear to 6 
support a more preventive service mix among practices. 7 
 8 
DISCUSSION 9 
 10 
We found no evidence that incidence of DCP use in NHS service provision contributed to 11 
practice efficiency, the level of use of DCPs or the relative contribution of DCP time in an 12 
NHS dental practice. However, our findings suggest that where DCPs have been substituted 13 
for dentist time in practices (as opposed to supplementing dentist time), preventive treatments 14 
constitute a larger proportion of practice service output. The absence of an association 15 
between DCP hours and productivity is consistent with findings from studies in the UK20, 16 
Finland21 and Norway22. However, our data are UK-specific and so the findings may not be 17 
generalizable, particularly since the UDA system is unique to England and Wales and the role 18 
of DCPs varies internationally23.  19 
 20 
We found an absence of DCP use in 53 practices (44% of the sample). This may be explained 21 
by a “free-rider” problem, whereby any dentist in the practice may refer work to the DCP, 22 
although a smaller number of dentists pay the DCP salary. For example, practice principals 23 
may be reluctant to hire a DCP if salaried Associate dentists could utilize the DCP to reduce 24 
their overall workload (and so not using freed up time to work on other important tasks). 25 
 26 
There are both strengths and limitations to this study. The large practice sample (n=121) in 27 
this study reduces the likelihood of overestimates of efficiency and improves identification of 28 
typical associations between inputs and outputs and between role substitution and efficiency 29 
scores. However, the cross-sectional nature of the data meant that the analysis could not 30 
 11 
determine the precise mechanisms underlying the findings or infer causality and the self-1 
report nature of the questionnaire data may have introduced measurement error into the 2 
efficiency estimate. A weakness of the available data is that healthcare outcomes are likely to 3 
be nested in a multilevel structure (practice, dentist, patient) and, because data were available 4 
only at the practice level, it was not possible to take this multilevel structure into account in 5 
the analyses. Another limitation of this study is the possibility of two forms of selection bias. 6 
There might be systematic bias in which type of dentist and DCP decided to participate in the 7 
study, and in those who did participate, employment of DCPs is not random. We found some 8 
evidence of bias in our study. The overall response rate was 27%, which could have 9 
introduced bias if non-response was unequal among eligible practices in the use of role 10 
substitution and/or practice healthcare outcomes. Follow-up contact with non-responding 11 
practices found the main reason for non-response was the reluctance to provide sensitive 12 
financial and/or contractual information that could be used to assess the profitability of the 13 
practice, despite the study having clearly stated procedures for ensuring the confidentiality of 14 
all collected information.  15 
  16 
Caution should also be exercised in the interpretation of the finding of lower efficiency scores 17 
among NHS practices that use DCPs, because it could be a consequence of the limited scope 18 
of the “efficiency” measure we used. Because DCPs do not contract directly with the NHS, 19 
the BSA data have no individual measure of DCP activity or outputs. As a result, we were 20 
constrained to analyse efficiency at the level of the NHS dental practice, not DCPs per se. It 21 
could be that DCPs are being used efficiently and in accordance with their full scope of 22 
practice, but their use is associated with a reduction in efficiency of the Practice Principals or 23 
Associates in NHS service delivery. For example, because of the output targets in the NHS 24 
contract, efficiency gains in the NHS may be lost to the private sector should dentist time 25 
released through DCP use be devoted to increasing private sector provision. 26 
  27 
Another limitation is that a practice that is achieving high levels of efficiency in activity may 28 
not be as high on measures of the effect that dental healthcare has on patients’ oral health or 29 
other relevant factors of overall performance in NHS dentistry, such as service coverage and 30 
access to care, responsiveness to changes in population needs and satisfaction with services. 31 
If practices are motivated by a professional desire to provide a good service, rather than a 32 
 12 
financial reason related to role substitution (e.g. the time saved to the dentists is used in 1 
another way to accrue greater remuneration), lower “efficiency” could even be a reflection of 2 
higher quality care that produces better patient outcomes and/or satisfaction by (for example), 3 
dentists taking more time with patients. This may explain the finding of association of lower 4 
“efficiency” scores for practices that use role-substitution. If a better patient outcome is 5 
thought by some dentists to be produced by preventive dental healthcare, then some practices 6 
may focus on prevention. As such, these practices will be less likely to accrue UDAs from 7 
higher UDA generating operational interventions and be more likely than other practices to 8 
use skill mix due to the inability of DCPs to perform operational interventions (such as DCPs 9 
are unable to prescribe fluoride, local analgesia and radiography or to provide a treatment 10 
plan under the NHS dental contract regulations). In addition, efficiency here is measured in 11 
terms of the quantity of resources used to produce a given quantity of a restricted range of 12 
services (that is, excluding orthodontics which is not covered by UDAs). DCP use may 13 
enhance practice efficiency in this specialist area of dentistry but this would not be captured 14 
in our UDA-based efficiency measure. 15 
 16 
So what else might explain the failure of DCP use to result in lower costs of producing 17 
contracted levels of activity? Before the introduction of the 2006 contract, there was a clear 18 
incentive to treat and no incentive to prevent, because dentists were paid to treat, to fill, 19 
crown, scale, extract and replace. With the introduction of UDAs in 2006, the incentives 20 
became more complex but practices were still remunerated for treatment. These contracts do 21 
not explicitly reward role substitution and will only indirectly reward the dentist if the time 22 
saved from role substitution is used in another way that is preferred by the dentist (e.g. seeing 23 
more patients or time away from work). In addition to the absence of a financial incentive 24 
that may encourage the use of role-substitution, the 2006 contract appears to have introduced 25 
a disincentive for Associate dentists to refer work to DCPs. Under current NHS regulations, 26 
DCPs are not allowed to undertake the examination themselves, despite recent changes to 27 
their scope of practice introduced by the Dental Regulator in 20132. As such, they rely on 28 
referrals from Practice Principals and Associates. However, work referred to DCPs is a loss 29 
of potential earnings for Associates. DCPs’ NHS activity is counted as Practice Principal 30 
activity and so in many practices they are in open competition with Associates for the number 31 
of UDAs that they can earn. For example, if an Associate dentist refers a patient for a tooth 32 
restoration to a DCP, the UDAs generated from this activity are mainly attributed to the 33 
 13 
Practice Principal (who pays for the DCP), not the Associate dentist. In this situation, the 1 
Associate dentist earns only one UDA (for the initial examination) out of a total of three 2 
UDAs (for an examination and a restoration). It follows that the inability of DCPs to 3 
undertake a NHS examination or to contract with NHS commissioners directly dis-4 
incentivises the use of role substitution within NHS dental practices, such that they are not 5 
being used to their full practice scope. Another possible explanation is the influence of the 6 
fixed ACV on practice output within the 2006 NHS dental contract in England. If there are 7 
practice efficiency improvements brought about by role substitution, it may depend on 8 
flexibility in inputs in the short term, and contracted employment arrangements may limit the 9 
capacity to adjust staff mix in the short-term. For example, if the NHS dental team achieve 10 
their ACV before the end of the financial year, there is no incentive to undertake any further 11 
NHS activity, given the penalties applied above 102% of the ACV. 12 
 13 
The need for better alignment between the financial incentives within the NHS dental 14 
contract and the use of DCPs is key if the NHS is to address the recommendations of the 15 
Independent Review6 and make best use of the whole dental workforce. The development of 16 
a direct DCP NHS contract would offer more flexibility for commissioners than a new 17 
contract with dentists or dental practices of remuneration by capitation payment, which is an 18 
approach that would, in theory, align financial incentives to role-substitution. Capitation 19 
remuneration payment in dentistry is not related to the quantity of treatment delivered and is 20 
usually for the number of registered patients. Role substitution under this type of contract is 21 
more likely because DCPs are trained to provide preventive activity and the health provided 22 
from preventive activity requires less input than the operative alternative. 23 
 24 
Under the current fiscal climate of constrained programme expenditures in many healthcare 25 
systems, it is important to consider sectors of healthcare where productivity improvements 26 
could be made without major capital spending. This study considered service re-organisation 27 
in dentistry in England. The potential for NHS dental practices to meet their NHS 28 
remuneration target using role substitution does not appear to be a feasible strategy for 29 
producing more General Dental Services from available NHS budgeted expenditures under 30 
current NHS contractual arrangements. The inability of DCPs to examine NHS patients under 31 
 14 
NHS regulations (despite being able to from a regulatory perspective), to contract with NHS 1 
commissioners directly and the ceiling threshold of the ACV, appear to be key constraints.  2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 15 
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Tables to appear in the main text 1 
Table 1: Input and output variables for healthcare production 2 
Variable 
name 
Measure of 
healthcare 
input or output 
Variable description Data source 
UDAs Output Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) BSA  
Patients seen Output Number of adult and children seen  BSA 
Treatment 
Plans 
Output The number of dental activity 
forms (individual claims made) 
BSA 
Weekly DCP 
sessions with 
NHS patients 
Input The number of sessions (half days) 
worked by Dental Hygienists, 
Hygiene-Therapists, Dental 
Therapists seeing NHS patients in a 
typical week 
Questionnaire  
Weekly 
dentist 
sessions with 
NHS patients  
Input The number of sessions (half days) 
worked by dentists (Practice 
Principals and Associates) seeing 
NHS patients in a typical week 
Questionnaire 
Weekly nurse 
sessions 
Input Number of sessions (half days) 
worked by dental nurses in a typical 
week 
Questionnaire 
Weekly 
administratio
n staff 
sessions  
Input The number of sessions (half days) 
worked by practice managers and 
administrative staff in a typical 
week  
Questionnaire 
Number of  
surgeries 
Input The number of surgeries that are 
typically in operation (for at least 3 
days per week) 
Questionnaire 
 20 
Table 2: Sample practices compared to national data 1 
Practice characteristics Sample 
mean 
(n=121) 
England 
mean 
(n=8,788
) 
P value 
of 
differenc
e in 
means 
Annual number of UDAs 15,444 10,494 <0.01 
Annual number of treatment plans (claim forms) 7,286 4,701 <0.01 
Annual number of patients seen 5,597 3,670 <0.01 
Percentage of UDAs from adults 73.6 65 0.02 
Percentage of UDAs from 40 year old and over patients 52.7 41 0.03 
Percentage of UDAs from patients exempt from patient 
charges 
37.3 41 0.73 
Percentage of claims that are Band 1 57.3 54 0.69 
Percentage of claims that are Band 2  28.4 30 0.86 
Percentage of claims that are Band 3 4.7 6 0.32 
Percentage of claims that are Urgent 9.6 9 0.75 
Active dentists at the practice 5.7 3.9 0.04 
Practice population England data obtained from the BSA for the year 2013/2014. Dentists 2 
considered "active" at a practice if there has been processed NHS claim in the analysed 3 
period. 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 21 
Table 3: Distribution of NHS general practice efficiency scores on UDAs, Treatment plans 1 
and patents seen. 2 
Efficiency scores Annual number of 
UDAs (mean score 
= 0.64) 
Annual number of 
treatment plans 
(claims) (mean 
score=0.63) 
Annual number of 
patients seen (mean 
score = 0.62) 
1 20 24 18 
0.9-0.99 27 29 31 
0.8-0.89 23 21 24 
0.7-0.79 26 28 25 
0.6-0.69 17 14 17 
0.5-0.59 5 4 6 
0.4-0.49 2 1 0 
Less than 0.4 1 0 0 
All 121 121 121 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 22 
Table 4: Association with efficiency scores and the level of role substitution  1 
Variable Output measure 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
p-
value 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
p-
value 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
p-
value 
Any use of DCPs with 
NHS patients 
- 0.14 <0.01 - - - - 
Weekly DCP sessions with 
NHS patients 
- - - 0.004 0.51 - - 
The proportion of DCP to 
dentist sessions seeing 
NHS patients 
- - - - 0.05 0.09 
Weekly dentist sessions 
with NHS patients* 
- 0.001 
 
0.76 0.001 0.73 - - 
Weekly support staff 
sessions 
- 0.005 
 
<0.01 - 0.005 <0.01 - 0.04 <0.01 
Number of dentist chairs 
for patient treatment 
 
- 0.04 0.02 - 0.04 0.05 - 0.17 0.10 
Percentage of adult non-
elderly patients 
- 0.19 0.09 - 0.21 0.11 - 0.14 0.35 
Percentage of adults with 
non-age related exemption  
- 0.13 
 
0.34 - 0.09 0.57 0.05 0.09 
 23 
*Weekly number of sessions per week worked by dentists on NHS patients is not present in 1 
model 3 to avoid correlation between that term and the proportion of DCP sessions to dentist 2 
sessions variable. 3 
 4 
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